Incentives in hierarchical organizations

    Vladimir Balashov Info
    Vladimir Burkov Info
    Dmitrij Novikov Info
    Aleksei Zalojnev Info
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3846/16111699.2003.9636042

Abstract

Game‐theoretical models of the incentive mechanisms are considered for the hierarchical organization.

First Published Online: 14 Oct 2010

Keywords:

game theory, decision making, organizational factors

How to Cite

Balashov, V., Burkov, V., Novikov, D., & Zalojnev, A. (2003). Incentives in hierarchical organizations. Journal of Business Economics and Management, 4(2), 81-85. https://doi.org/10.3846/16111699.2003.9636042

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June 30, 2003
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Copyright (c) 2003 The Author(s). Published by Vilnius Gediminas Technical University.

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Published

2003-06-30

Issue

Vol 4 No 2 (2003)

Section

Articles

Copyright

Copyright (c) 2003 The Author(s). Published by Vilnius Gediminas Technical University.

License

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

How to Cite

Balashov, V., Burkov, V., Novikov, D., & Zalojnev, A. (2003). Incentives in hierarchical organizations. Journal of Business Economics and Management, 4(2), 81-85. https://doi.org/10.3846/16111699.2003.9636042

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