THE SOULS OF EUROPE

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How should Europe deal politically with its legacy as a so-called "Christian civilization"? Should this imply an overt reference to God or to the Christian or Judeo-Christian tradition in European constitutional documents (as was debated when the so-called "Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe" was tabled)? This debate raised the old "politico-theological problem": does a political order need some kind of metaphysical or religious grounding, a "soul", or can it present itself as a purely rational order, the result of a utilitarian calculus? In this article it is argued that the secular idea of the state as an inherent element in the "Judeo-Christian tradition", for a "divine state" usurps a place that is only God's. So, this religious tradition itself calls for a secular state, and this inherent relationship between religion and secularity has become a key element for the interpretation of European civilization, most notably in the idea of a separation of the church and the state. But the very fact that this is a religious idea does imply that the European political order cannot be seen as a purely rational political order without a soul. The idea of a "plural soul" is proposed as a way out of the dilemma.

Keywords: Europe, European civilization, Judeo-Christian tradition, political order, religion, secularity.

1. An old story...

Hidden somewhere in the Biblical Old Testament (I Samuel, ch. 4) there is a remarkable story. The people of Israel are caught up in a fight with its archenemies, the Philistines. Israel is losing. But religious people know what to do when they seem to lose: try to get God involved. In a holy tent, the tabernacle, far from the battlefield, duly protected from all curious glances or sacrilegious actions, there was a richly decorated bin, which from the days of old had been the symbol of God's presence, the so-called "Ark of the Covenant". And now the idea comes up to go and get this bin out of its holy tent and bring it to the army camp. The idea is greeted with a great enthusiasm: God on our side, we can be sure of victory. The Ark is transported into the camp and is thus involved in combat action. Morale is up again. But on the rebound the Philistines are aroused by this new enthusiasm on the Israelite side, and they engage in battle with renewed energy, too. It all ends in a complete Israelite defeat – the supposed presence of God notwithstanding. Israel has to conclude: apparently, for a

few moments God was not where he was supposed to be. He had left the bin. At the very moment that God is going to be actively implicated in politics, he apparently withdraws. In war Israel gets an experience of the secularity of power.

This old story can be interpreted as a boost for a position that wants to exclude religion from the political sphere. No God in a constitution. And seen from the other angle: whoever proposes in a political document to give an explicit role to God, or to the Christian or Judeo-Christian tradition, has a hard time fitting this story into the argumentation. For it is exactly the God of the Old Testament who at the same time is the God of the New Testament, who cannot be bribed, who cannot be magically manipulated and who does not allow that He himself is used as a vehicle for political power.

2. The soul of Europe?

More than a decade ago Jacques Delors, then president of the European Commission, urged European churches: "If we don't succeed within the next ten years in giving a soul to Europe, a spiritual dimension, real meaning, then we will have wasted our time. (E)urope cannot live only on the basis of legal argumentation and economic knowledge. The potentials of the Treaty of Maastricht will not be realized without inspiration of some sort." (cf. Korthals Altes 1999).

The problem that comes up here is the so-called "politico-theological problem"[1]. Time and again those in power discover, often to their dismay, that human life has deeper dimensions than can be touched upon by politics. People (politicians, perhaps, included) rarely feel inspired by politics as such. The struggle for power is often disgusting. The politician, therefore, sets out to acquire respect and devotion of the subjects. Therefore, in every political order "piety" (*pietas*) or "reverence" (*reverential*) plays a central role, whether this regards piety for a Pharaoh, for an emperor, for the laws of the city or respect for human rights. The need more for a deeper than rational adherence to the political order is exactly the reason why those in power look towards religion and towards the social and psychological infrastructures of religions with jealousy. Religion seems to be able to touch people in places where no king can enter, in the heart, in the soul. It seems particularly well equipped to install the fear or the respect that is required as a complement to mere self-interest as a basis for the political order (which, for example, modern contract theories tend to emphasize).

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[1] The term *political theology* here does not refer to the specific theological movement that originated in the 1960s with Johann Baptist Metz, Jürgen Moltmann and Dorothee Sölle, and Liberation Theology in Latin America. Here, it refers to a specific problem in political theory: the continuous occurrence, the possibility and the alleged necessity of a metaphysical undergirding of a political order. The term *political theology* originates in Plato, *Politeia*, II, 379a, where he speaks of "different patterns of speaking about the gods" (*typoi peri theologias*). Recently, it has been elaborated in various ways by thinkers as diverse as Carl Schmitt, Eric Voegelin, Leo Strauss and Claude Lefort. At present, the global resurgence of religion has fostered new interest in the subject (see Vries 2006).

Regarding the specific relation between politics and the soul, there are different roads to travel, each road having its own possibilities and its own obstacles (for a more refined typology of relations between religion and the political order see Linz 1996):

a. State-cult or civil religion. The first option is the development of an official state cult, as this occurred in Ancient Egypt or in the Roman Empire. Pharaohs and emperors can be worshipped as gods[2] (Cf. for the state religions in Egypt and Mesopotamia, Frankfurt 1978). But even in 18th century "enlightened" France it was Jean Jacques Rousseau who argued for a "rélidon civile" (*Du Contrat Social* IV. 8). This might as well be completely secular, as long as it delivers the goods, fostering an attitude of pietas, of "love for one's civil duties", to use Rousseau's words. The problem that is encountered along this road is that a state cult is experienced as too superficial. The cult does not really inspire, it does not touch the soul, as the Roman emperors discovered. This must have been at least one of the reasons that they in a later phase switched sides and invited Christianity to play the role of the official cult of the Empire (Praet 1997);

b. Alliance. Those in power can also try to forge an alliance with an already existing, often relatively small but content-wise quite appealing and strong religion. The result is a politico-religious alliance: the Persian Empire with Zoroastrian religion, the Indian empire of Ashoka with Buddhism, the Roman Empire with early Christianity, the Frankish empire with Latin Christianity, the Russian empire with Orthodoxy; or, on a more national level, Gallicanism and Anglicanism. Or a certain religion sometimes from the outset can foster an integrating framework for an emerging empire, as in early Islam. The problem here is that it is quite uncertain whether the adherents of the religion in case are willing to accept this alliance, this marriage. Very often the relationship between political and religious leaders is very troubling indeed (although this can have surprising consequences as it had in European civilization, see below);

c. Separation. The third option is to abandon religion in all its forms out of the public sphere. The political order is then presented as being a sphere of strict rationality without emotional strings attached, of ratio and not of pietas. This solution has been proposed frequently in modern times (and by implication we do not have any longstanding practical experience with it). In this case it all comes down to convincing the subjects that the political order is the right one from a rational point of view (cf. Rawls 1971): inspiration based on rationalization. The political order has to justify itself before the forum of calculating civilians.

The difficulty here is that the original "politico-theological" problem is somehow neglected instead of answered. One has to accept a motivational deficit, what Charles Taylor has called the "articulation deficit" of contemporary ethics (Taylor 1989: 53ff). This can be remedied by permanently satisfying all possible needs and desires, thus resulting more in decadence than in inspiration. But the greatest weakness of this

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[2] Until recently the majority of Roman historians, echoing Kurt Latte, considered the importance of the Imperial Cult in classical times to be quite marginal. Thanks to the work of esp. Duncan Fishwick this opinion has changed drastically (see Fishwick 1987–1992; Brent 1999).

model is its vulnerability, its fragility. A political order "after ideology" that has no deeper inspirational infrastructure can quite easily be taken by surprise through the rise of charismatic figures who are somehow able to convey the impression that they can fill the ideological vacuum.

3. A religious secularity

The second road is the one that traveled mostly throughout European history. After Constantine it fell upon Christianity to deliver the inspiring moral framework for the Roman Empire, and afterwards for its Western and Eastern imperial heirs. Christianity became the main supplier of political *pietas*.

But what about the experience of Israel that God can withdraw himself at the very moment that he is implicated in a political order? The God of Israel always keeps himself at a critical distance from power. According to the Book of Samuel (where the passage referred to above is to be found) that in the Christian tradition was a source of inspiration for a whole genre of the so-called "Mirrors of Princes", God is even against kingship as such. In the stories every king receives a critical prophet over against him: Saul is accompanied by Samuel, David by Nathan, Achab by Elia, Hizkia by Isaiah (Voegelin 1956: 224–248, esp. 245ff.).

The Christians showed themselves quite conscious of this old experience of Israel; that was a part of the Christian heritage too. They tended to redefine radically the concept of pietas: only Jesus Christ should be the object of one's ultimate allegiance, no human being, even if he is the emperor. Peter Brown relates the story of Pontius Meropius Paulinus (355–431), a senator from Aquitania, who in a correspondence with a pagan friend had redefined *pietas* as the virtue of being loyal to Christ and Christ only (Brown 1997).

The key figure in this regard is, of course, St. Augustine. In his *De Civitate Dei* he makes a strong distinction between two spiritual directions that human beings can take in life, the one characterized by the *amor Dei*, the other by the *amor sui*. The *amor sui* is characterized by the manipulative relationships toward one's fellow human beings, who are made into objects of domination. The love of God enacts itself in an affirmation of one's fellow human beings, a joyful *volo quod sis* (I want you to exist). And for Augustine, the basic principle of all actually existing political orders, especially empires, is the *amor sui*, the subjection and enslavement of other people (*De Civitate Dei* XIV, 28; cf. *De Catechezandis Rudibus* 19, 31). This is if anything a full-blown depreciation of empire! There is nothing divine to be found in empire as such. Augustine, then, proceeds (in book XIX) to make relative judgments about relatively less evil empires and more evil empires, according to the way they treat people, especially conquered nations.

Seen from this angle it immediately becomes clear: the experience of the "secularity" of politics in itself can be very well a *religious* experience and not a secular one. The *religious* experience of the political order as a secular order even predates all purely secular accounts by millennia (Cf. O'Donovan 1996; Bruijne 2006). The

story told above is to be found within a religious book, read within religious traditions. All kinds of insights regarding good kingship developed in these traditions. On the one hand, within these traditions politics has not become a purely secular affair; on the other hand, no political order is *a priori* sanctified religiously. The key point is that power is seen as criticizable and that hence moral criteria have to be formulated which allows for the measuring of a political order. This is the road that often has been traveled along, both in the Old Testament stories and in the actual practice of the Christian Church.

Just think of the following episode. In early 390 Roman troops, involved in a major "pacification operation" in the Greek town of Thessaloniki, did stage a massacre. Word about this got out and reached Ambrosius, at that time residing bishop in Milan, where the emperor happened to reside often. Ambrosius judged this to be the case of excessive violence, especially against women and children. He publicly held the emperor accountable. If Theodosius wanted to ally himself with the Christian faith, there are some moral-political obligations to fulfill. Ambrosius summoned the emperor to publicly confess or otherwise be excommunicated. And emperor or not, Theodosius had no choice but to comply, not dressed in his imperial robe, but only in a simple penitential garment (McLynn 1994; Brown 1992: 109ff).

This episode marks an epoch in Western political history. Here is someone who the highest power on earth is vested in and, yet, he has to abandon the claim of having a privileged entrance towards the divine and hence of being sacrosanct. This religious "secularization" of politics had far reaching consequences in Europe. Here, with all ups and downs a process was started; there, gradually during fifteen centuries, the critique of the powers that became a part of those power structures themselves, a process in which the critique of politics became a part of politics.

This road has not been the only one in Western civilization. There was always the seducing attraction of a competing political theology that remained very close to the ancient imperial theology. So, in Western civilization two conceptions of political theology confronted each other. According to the first power emanated directly and unconditionally from God into those in power. God and power are indistinguishably united. One encounters this type of thinking throughout history, not only in Europe, but outside Europe in secularized form as well. It is, perhaps, the world historical "default –option" for power presenting itself, its "natural" form. There is no room for criticism. Let us call this the A(bsolutist) theology. In this line the concept of "sovereignty" becomes a crucial one (Buijs 2003).

According to the other conception, it is the sacred duty of those in power to constantly remember, both on the level of principle and on the level of practice, that they are *not* God, that they are fallible, that they can function as bearer of power only in as far as they honor higher principles. The piety is devoted here to an order of right, to which might is subjected. Let us call this the B(inding)-theology or B(oundary)-theology. This B-theology has caused great but often very creative tensions in the course of European history. Its key procedure was the articulation of qualitative,

moral, criteria for the political order, the fulfillment of which became conditional for the allegiance of the people to the political order.

A very important problem in this respect, of course, is whether it is possible to find a place, outside the logics of power, where these qualitative criteria can be articulated, a place that is "by nature" free of the longing for dominance, that is "Herrschaftsfrei" (to use a Habermassian phrase). The first agent that provided such a place has been the Christian Church. One can make a rather strong argument that it has been the historically first instance of what today is called "civil society": a place of moral deliberation and action that is non-governmental on principle, and yet where authoritative moral concepts are formulated that provide a kind of moral framework for the political order. The church assumed the role of providing a platform where a moral debate about "good governance" could be conducted and that also was able to convert the outcomes of the debate into political pressure (without wanting to replace the political structures). The term that came to be used for this moral pressure on politics was introduced by Cardinal Bellarminus around 1610 as *potestas indirecta*, which can still be considered to be the mode of operation of civil society. From the eighteenth century onward what Jürgen Habermas has called the "public sphere" develops as a critical complement to the church, especially in cases where the church has lost its 'non-governmental' character (Habermas 1991; cf. Gramsci 1971). But throughout modernity, and in recent years perhaps even stronger than long before, the Christian church(es) in the West (and increasingly in the non-Western world, too) have continued to play that role (Casanova 1994: 231ff).

4. The B-theology in Western civilization

What did this B-theology look like? A first element is the "dedivinization" of power (Voegelin 1952: 107ff). Neither emperor nor king is divine. And the implication is: power is never to be absolute.

Secondly: if God does not present himself via hierarchical power structures, this does have decisive implications for the relationship between man and God. Apparently, this relationship cannot be governed by force. Politics has to recede. In this way, there emerges a new awareness of human conscience as a meeting place of God and man, that has to be respected by the political order and cannot be entered into from the outside. Although this awareness was articulated on principle already by Tertullian and Augustine, the political recognition of the so-called freedom of conscience was very slow and hesitant. However, during the period of the Reformation and the subsequent religious wars, there was an entire tradition of arguments that could be traced back to early Christianity on which one could draw if one wanted to defend this freedom. The freedom of religious conscience even has become the first officially codified human right (article XIII, *Treaty of Utrecht* 1579; see Vermeulen 1989: 1–73; Schinkel 2007; Witte 2007).

The third central element is the equality of all people. If God's dwelling place is not primarily with the powerful up high, or even stronger (drawing on the *Magnificat*) and if God "has put down the mighty from their thrones and exalted those of low degree", all kinds of inequality can no longer be justified on principle. Everybody is a dwelling place for the Eternal One (Rist 1982).

Fourthly, exactly because of the fact that everybody can be a divine dwelling place, special care has to be extended towards the weak that easily can get crushed in the societal machinery. Caring for the weak, (the poor, widows, orphans, the ill etc.) has become a virtue that has been practiced in many ways (the often forgotten and often scandalized *caritas*), and time and again it has been used as a touchstone for the justice of a political order. The 19th century Christian-social movement has deep roots within the Christian tradition (Brown 2002; Buijs 2008).

The fifth point concerns the non-hierarchical nature of authority. In the course of the Middle Ages the hierarchical conception of authority made headways within the Christian tradition. But within the church a struggle, that showed that the Christian tradition has other possibilities too, developed. Over against the so-called "papalists", staunch defenders of a hierarchical conception of authority, there emerged a movement of so-called 'conciliarists' who were of the opinion that God's authority was given to the body of the church as a whole that could be represented by a broad council, which in its turn could delegate its authority to a pope. Some important medieval political thinkers applied this model to the political sphere as well (Morral 1980: 119ff.; Ozment 1980: 135–181; Black 1992: 162–185). Inspired partly by conciliarist thinking Calvinism has established a model of church-organization from below, a congregational structure, that later on was applied to the political order as well (Skinner 1978: 34–47; Berman 2003; Sap 1993). In this respect the Dutch theologian Noordmans has stated that Calvin placed the pope in checkmate with the pawn of the congregational elder.

These five elements together are a hidden reservoir of a B-theology, where the mainstream of Western society could draw upon. Or else, when this mainstream somehow cut itself off from this reservoir and allied itself to a type of A-theology, there were all kinds of critical movements in and outside the official ecclesiastical and political structures that were able to find their way towards this reservoir and re-open it. The emergence of the principles of the rule of law and democracy is unthinkable without this reservoir.

5. Secular?

The reconstruction just given is not to be interpreted as an attempt to claim Europe or the constitutional democracy in general as an exclusively Christian product. I have told "a" story about Europe. One can imagine that other stories can be told as well. One can tell stories about Europe in which Socrates and Athens hold center stage. Or, one can draw quite accusing pictures of all dark connections between the Christian tradition and the A-theology (see Moore 1987; cf. Sweetman 2000). In short, there

are more stories that can be told. Each of these can show a certain alliance between key elements of the central political institutions of Europe with specific religious or non-religious worldviews. And there are also critical stories to be told about all kinds of violent shortcuts between these political institutions and these religious and non-religious traditions.

However, if there is some truth in the picture I have just sketched, at least the standard picture of our constitutional democracy being the sole product of rational Enlightenment is clearly defective. All kinds of basic intuitions are shaped by and became authoritative within a religious context, in this case a Christian context. That is particularly true of the insight that politics is not a means of eternal salvation and, therefore, has to be limited. Politics is not everything. This "secular" account of politics is genetically embedded in a non-secular context. The question is whether it can survive outside such a context. For the moment, the idea that it can is empirically not yet corroborated. Statements to the contrary more than anything else betray a secular-fundamentalist agenda. It contains an element of risk when one without further argument just throws up the opinion that we can do away with this religious reservoir of resources. It is all yet to be seen. What we have witnessed so far in modernity are several very strong movements that have attempted to again vest the political order with some ultimate meaning, a strong resurgence of "political theologies" in the sense of encompassing ideologies, like Communism and Nazism (Voegelin 1952: 107ff.; Lefort 1986: chs. 6 and 8). This is not very reassuring for the secularist agenda.

6. The souls of Europe

The "politico-religious problem" remains central: the motivational weakness of the strictly secular. The problem of Europe (not too much different in this respect from every modern constitution) is how to combine a certain consciously chosen spiritual emptiness with the badly needed sense of loyalty. The idea of one collective soul is abandoned and yet, somehow the soul has to be involved in the political order.

In Germany some people (Habermas is a key spokesman among them) are experimenting with the idea of "Verfassungspatriotismus", a sense of collective pride regarding the own constitution – an interesting option in the tradition of a "civil religion". Which option is advisable for Europe? Presenting Europe as a rational construction, while at the same time relegating all religious and non-religious worldviews as publicly irrelevant to the public sphere, will probably end up in a Europe that is purely economistic and does not have any moral authority.

The best option perhaps is, in line with the B-theology, to express openly the impasse regarding the political status of the soul and then try to build strength out of this weakness. What could this imply for the discussion about a possible European constitution? As a matter of fact, steps in this direction are taken in the pre-amble as it was formulated in the now formally abandoned "Constitutional Treaty". But this could be done and should be done in a way that is much less exclusively humanistic.

Explicitly the awareness of the limits of politics could be expressed. That can be done by a reference to "God", as is proposed from different sides (and those who enjoy ridiculing this proposal only show that they do not understand the politico-theological problem at all, which might be a dangerous attitude in itself!). But this is problematic. Which God? The God of the A-theology or of the B-theology? And would not this imply that, in one way or another, the political order is claimed for one tradition, while a modern political order is all about the establishment of spiritual freedom for all, according to some of these very same religious traditions? A better option seems to be to make clear from the outset that the political order has not set out to reign in the souls of the subject, but to ask for a critical commitment of the soul of the Europeans. This could result in something like this:

> "Well aware that it is not for a political order to reign in the souls of its inhabitants and impinge upon the spiritual freedom of the people, we acknowledge that the central values that we consider binding for the European community are shaped by various religious and non-religious value- and virtue-traditions and that for their inspiring power they will constantly need the critical support of these traditions. The values that the Community has been offered from these various sources and according to which standards it constantly should be measured are… (and then follows the list that is presented in the preamble as now proposed)".

Connected to this can be an open invitation to a permanent, public debate about these values and their inspiring sources:

> "Therefore the Union invites representatives of various value- and virtue-traditions to formulate jointly and separately (in a way that allows for public accountability) in what way Europe can fulfill their requirements for a just political order and to present this in a public dialogue to the Union".

In this way Europe acknowledges openly that it contains not one but at least a number of souls. The political order, therefore, cannot be monopolized by one group or one tradition, be this Christian or secular. It actually is an "overlapping consensus", a very fruitful idea that comes up in John Rawls' later work, and which implies, in my view, a marked deviation from his earlier work. The idea of an overlapping consensus recognizes the positive role that various faith traditions can play in the legitimacy of a political order (Rawls 1993). A constitution is a public attempt to draw together a number of souls within one political order. In this way it is prevented that a debate about the "values" (though a term of dubious quality in itself, there are no easy alternatives) of Europe is cut off prematurely by one group who monopolizes the debate.

7. A Christian Europe?

What should be the answer of representatives of the Christian tradition in Europe to such an invitation? There are good reasons to arrive at the position that the Christian tradition should refuse to provide for the imperial theology of whichever political order, either on the state level or on the level of Europe. For the Christian tradition there is no "holy ground".

However, this "No" is not all there to be said. It would be an indication of a defective sense of responsibility if one just leaves the political order for what it is and not show any commitment in regard of the question how and under what conditions bridges can be built between the soul of people and European political order. So, the clear "No…" has to be accompanied by an equally clear "unless…". Elements like spiritual freedom, the equality before the law of all people regardless of race or sex, the protection of human dignity, with special reference to the poor and those in need, will be central here. If a political order shows itself to be (relatively) "just", this has to be acknowledged openly. Liturgically for this critical-positive attitude the Christian church has two options of prayer and thanksgiving. But the actual relation between these two elements has to be critically established anew any moment. This implies that the Christian community should practice the art of measurement.

8. Some against the grain-conclusions

Some conclusions can be drawn; conclusions that may be a bit against the grain of current debates.

a. There is no point in claiming the democratic-constitutional political order as the exclusive result of one worldview, be this religious or secular. That would be both empirically untenable and politically short-sighted. Seen from the historical perspective, the democratic-constitutional state is a unique but at the same time fragile experiment. Therefore, it needs all the support that can be mobilized for it, all the *pietas* it can get, from various sources. In this way a constant debate is waged about the "humanizing" potential of the various worldviews, almost a kind of competition. Sometimes this debate will come to the conclusion that there is something like an "overlapping consensus" (John Rawls) between various worldviews regarding some elements of the democratic-constitutional tradition, sometimes differences will come to the fore regarding its sources and regarding the exact measurement of its various elements;

b. For the various worldview traditions to function as a way of generating political pietas it is necessary that the different stories are told publicly. Then it may be asked to actively and openly mark their position within the democratic-constitutional state and develop something as a "public theology". Such theology indicates how on the basis of one's own tradition one will operate within the public sphere, given that no tradition is allowed to claim a "theocratic" monopoly. As a matter of fact I did something like this for the Christian tradition (albeit in a very rudimentary way) by sketching the B-theology;

c. Is every tradition to the same extent able to develop such a public theology? Traditions are never static or unequivocal. I illustrated the point already by distinguishing between an A-theology and a B-theology, that are both present within the Christian tradition (although I am inclined to say that B is more representative of "true" Christianity than A). Whoever searches from the 17th to the 19th century Orthodox-Catholicism for a public theology in the sense just adumbrated will not

find very much (one would have to go back almost to Augustine and Thomas). However, in the 20th century there developed "théologie nouvelle" and "humanisme intégral" (Jacques Maritain), that deeply influenced a very influential council (speaking about conciliarism!), Vaticanum II. Pope John Paul II became one of the most outspoken defenders of human rights and based on this new personalism showed himself to be very critical both of communist totalitarianism and of contemporary processes of worldwide economization.[3] At an earlier stage Calvinism developed the elements of public theology. In the Netherlands in the 19th century these elements are unfolded further by the Calvinist Abraham Kuyper who abandoned all theocratic ambitions and became a staunch defender of a plural society (Heslam 1998; Bratt 1998). Exactly in this way he was able to launch a non-utopian, realistic, "architectonic" critique of society. Whether inside Islam such a public theology as a bridge towards the constitutional democracy can be developed as well is one of the most pressing questions of this moment. There are some attempts in that direction, but there is no question that there are many signals that point in the opposite direction (see Casanova 2001);

d. It is counterproductive to force upon religions a modern Western type of Enlightenment before allowing them in the public sphere. That would be somewhat like asking every tradition to produce its own heretics that undermine that selfsame tradition, or in short: to abandon oneself. A credible public theology can only be developed by those that remain somewhat connected to "orthodoxy". Whoever requires the internal secularization of religions as an entrance-ticket for the public sphere is probably more involved in settling private accounts with "religion" than in furthering the common good of the "commonwealth".

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[3] See especially his encyclical *Centesimus Annus* (1991). For the role of Catholicism in what has come to be called the "third wave of democratization" (see Huntington 1991).

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EUROPOS SIELOS

Govert J. Buijs

Santrauka

Kaip politine prasme Europa turėtų pasielgti su savu vadinamuoju „krikščioniš-kosios civilizacijos“ palikimu? Ar šis palikimas turėtų atvirai nurodyti Dievą arba krikščioniškąją, arba žydiškąją-krikščioniškąją, tradiciją, aptinkamą konstituciniuose Europos dokumentuose (kai buvo svarstoma pateikta vadi-namoji „Sutartis dėl Konstitucijos Europai“)? Ši diskusija iškėlė seną „politi-nę-teologinę problemą“: ar politinei santvarkai reikia tam tikro metafizinio, ar religinio pamato, „sielos“? O gal ta politinė santvarka gali būti suprantama kaip grynai racionali tvarka, kaip utilitarinės apskaitos rezultatas? Šiame straipsnyje įrodinėjama, kad sekuliarios valstybės idėja yra neatsiejama nuo „žydiškosios-krikščioniškosios tradicijos“, dėl „Dievo valstybės“ uzurpuojanti paties Dievo vietą. Tad ši religinė tradicija reikalauja sekuliarios valstybės, o nesuardomas religijos ir sekuliarumo santykis tapo kertiniu akmeniu Europos civilizacijos interpretacijoje, labiausiai išryškėjančiu bažnyčios ir valstybės perskyros idė-joje. Tačiau pats faktas, kad ši idėja yra religinio pobūdžio, leidžia teigti, jog politinė Europos santvarka negali būti vertinama kaip grynai racionali politinė santvarka, neturinti sielos. „Grynosios sielos“ idėja čia siūloma kaip galimas išeities taškas, sprendžiant minėtą dilemą.

Reikšminiai žodžiai: Europa, Europos civilizacija, žydiškoji-krikščioniškoji tradicija, politinė santvarka, religija, sekuliarumas.