



## II. STATE, SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN A POSTMODERN WORLD

### NATION STATE AND COSMOPOLITAN IDENTITY IN A POSTMODERN WORLD OF GLOBALIZATION

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The article problematizes the pressing dilemma that the postmodern age is posing to the globalized world in which the nation state is on one side losing its strengths and sovereignty, but on the other side is being strengthened by the unexpected effect of globalization. It is the effect of fighting for one's own identity, with which the national identity of citizens is also becoming stronger. But the other side, which the cosmopolitan standpoint also represents, is trying to open the closed communities of the communitarian type to other horizons, with which the citizens would not have to sacrifice their own identities; they would merely have to admit the inevitability of multi-levelness of identity. The article espouses the thesis that the formation of a cosmopolitan identity, which could be encouraged by a globalized cultural environment of a postmodern age, is not merely a possibility, but a reality, which should also be recognized by political structures.

Keywords: communitarianism, cosmopolitanism, culture, globalization, identity, nation state, postmodern age.

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#### Introduction

The age of globalization offers a multiplied possibility of awareness of the plurality of the world. To talk of globalization, which creates a cohesive field of convergence, is misleading, according to the statement written above. A global media market does make it easier to gather information on the foreign and the different and does ensure the accessibility of knowledge that was not available to the previous generations (or at least not as easily), but this does “not mean, that we know about them [others] enough

or that we are ‘closer’ to them because of it” (Rizman 2008: 22). Actually, the opposite often occurs, because “a strongly increased consciousness and knowledge of ‘others’ (different ones) on the other side strengthens the identity of the observers who compare themselves to these ‘others’ (different ones)” (Rizman 2008: 22). The most obvious socio-political unit established based on diversifying is a nation state, but with globalization the groups that are being reinforced are not only the ethnical-national ones, but also the ones who are not based merely on territory or geography, with an identity founded on other predicates, such as gender, race, religion, sexual preferences, or age. Globalization on one hand means a compression of time and space, which should consequentially mean that people are getting increasingly closer, but that is not what is happening because on the other hand, the self-awareness and identity of the subject itself is being reinforced by it being informed on anything other, different, and foreign, since the subject is trying to protect and defend itself from an intrusion of an identity of a stranger. “Numerous contacts with ‘foreigners’ contributed more to an increased awareness of our own (national, cultural) diversity that offered a contribution to a realization on us being ‘cosmopolitan’” (Rizman 2008: 23). That is why Anthony D. Smith’s (1998: 213) question is justified, when he asks “can we envisage a time, not only when ethnic nationalism has run its course, but when nation states, national identities and nationalism in general will have been superseded by cosmopolitan culture and supranational governance?”. Is it possible then to finally put what is left of modernism – namely the nation state – to sleep and to pass to a form of postmodern multilevel identity and a cosmopolitan culture as a positive result of globalization?

The paper aims to study standpoints argued by cosmopolitanism and communitarianism which defends the standpoint of a traditional nation state system. Through the concept of citizenship and belonging, the meaning of emotionality, educational system and culture I will present a thesis that focuses on the middle ground between cosmopolitanism and nation state instead of focusing on strict decomposition of nation states and transition to an universal cosmopolitan state. All the conditions to realize this middle ground are already met. This will be presented with a multilevel identity matrix that manifests the structure of an individual’s identity as a multi-identity. An individual can easily adapt to several identity relationships and contexts, while switching between them is not difficult to him, and can also orient himself in different contexts simultaneously. Lastly, I will show that the political entities work on the same basis, as well as the individuals who are a part of political entities (local communities or nation states and international formations).

### Cosmopolitan standpoint

Cosmopolitanism demands of us that based on our sense of humanity, we as humans have moral obligations to other human beings: every human, because they are human, is morally responsible for other humans. Cosmopolitanism as a political theory is based on a recognition of an idea of a person which is ethically a part of an idea of common moral obligations towards others, and the reason for this is basic humanity

(Lu 2000: 245). Cosmopolitanism is both a moral and a political project. If it is understood as a moral project, it often presents itself as a moral core and as a demand for fundamental duties in the theory of global justice, the protection of universal human rights and the transformation of an unjust international system. This moral dimension of cosmopolitanism can be connected to institutional cosmopolitanism, which focuses primarily on research and discovery of institutional arrangements, which could implement the previously mentioned moral norms in the best possible way. Charles Beitz (1994: 124) understands the political manifestation of this moral theory as an effort to change political structures in a way where nation states and other political structures would have to submit themselves or their power to some kind of an authority of a transnational organization. Institutional cosmopolitanism is trying to shake up the conditions under which there would be an option to form a *world government*. A key difference between moral and political cosmopolitanism is concisely shown in what we morally *must* do, and *how* we can do it. Ulrich Beck (2010) wrote that regardless of any theoretical division, the awareness of common global problems themselves (for example awareness of the environmental challenges, non-realization of the UN millennium declaration, nuclear threats, and others) is what enables the cultivation of universal faith in the future of the global collective. The awareness of a *risk society* not only enables said society to have a cosmopolitan future, but it is also making it politically and socially necessary. “The real theoretical and political challenge of the second modernity is the fact that the society must respond to all these challenges simultaneously” (Beck 2010: 217). In short, moral responsibility and duty of a cosmopolitan is global universal care. “Cosmopolitan is the person whose allegiance is to the worldwide community of human beings” (Nussbaum 2010: 155).

Sociologist Gerard Delanty (2009: 54–68) supports the division of cosmopolitan theories into three parts: the moral, political, and cultural cosmopolitanism. 1) Moral cosmopolitanism deals with thoughts on the moral community; roughly defends the position that every human being belongs to the same moral community in the sense of a global egalitarianism and a universalism of a cosmopolitan ethic. 2) Political cosmopolitanism can only be established on the basis of moral cosmopolitanism and demands institutional reforms on a global level. According to Immanuel Kant that can be achieved by having a republican government of a global federal alliance of all states and nations; today we speak of a *world government* and similar concepts. 3) Cultural cosmopolitanism puts emphasis especially on a positive relationship to other cultures. If moral cosmopolitanism deals mainly with inter-subjective relations, and political with international ones, it could be said that cultural cosmopolitanism is more about intercultural relationships. It is possible to claim that there is almost no theoretician out there who would defend cultural relativism and want the whole world to become *sweet ol’ hometown* to everybody. No, but we are merely speaking of stressing the question of where is the line between what feels “like home”, which, according to some convictions should be given (moral) higher ground, and what is foreign, that which we do not have to care about as much as we do for own community, which we belong to, and which serves as warranty for our own self-awareness and identity.

Delanty's division of cosmopolitanism could be considered rather stiff, but all three of his aspects are based on common predispositions: 1) the primal units of moral care are the individual human beings, 2) the moral care for all individuals must be equal, which is to say that all human beings are equal, and 3) the cosmopolitan standpoint applies equally to all individuals that live in this world. Cosmopolitanism so obviously demands thoughts on global justice, global ethics (*Weltethos*), politics and economy in an era of globalization, on postmodern culture, but most of all on a (*passé*) nation state as a product of the modern.

### Communitarian standpoint

Communitarianism lends itself to the standpoint that justice only relates to the people who are a part of our community, because a condition of justice is an identification relationship between members of the same community. For some the concept of justice relates merely to formal social and political structures with their borders strictly defined – a clear line between *us* and *them* is therefore also a clear line between our and their moral duties. Communitarianism can be understood in a wider sense as a standpoint of defense, or justification of a national order, in the sense of nationalism or patriotism; or in a more narrow sense as a glorification of a closed social group or a community of people.

Collective consciousness within a particular social group can ensure cohesiveness and solidarity only within the boundaries of said group. And while communitarianism does offer many good solutions to promote strong, solid, and stable social connections inside the group, those never do reach very far – they can only go as far as the particular social group can extend. It is for this reason that Max Weber criticized Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, accusing them of only defending class solidarity and not common social solidarity. It is possible to claim that Marx and Engels excluded the option of common social solidarity at the very beginning. As we can read in *The German Ideology*, they also espouse the thesis that individuals only form a social class when there exists another social class to oppose them and form a class struggle. But mere existence of a social class is not enough for solidarity to form within it; being in a similar economic situation is not what will bring individuals into a co-existence with solidarity. Marx and Engels thought that something more was necessary for something like that to occur. Not unlike Émile Durkheim (1912), who assumed the necessity of a collective consciousness, Marx and Engels demanded a *class consciousness* which promotes solidarity through a realization that “by acting together the members of a class can obtain more than they could by acting in isolation” (Elster 1985: 347). However, there is no assurance that the individuals will recognize the class interests as their own. There is always the possibility of egoism, which may threaten the class or collective efforts. These are the concerns that have turned Weber away from adopting class interest as a potential anchor point of social (class) solidarity. He understood class as merely one of possible forms of collective action, for which it is not necessary to be actualized.

## The concept of citizenship and belonging

Many contemporary sociologists and political philosophers are trying to remind us by awakening the idea of a global citizenship that the transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*<sup>1</sup> does not necessarily mean unavoidable doom for society or humanity. By returning to old Grecian, Stoic and Kantian tradition they call for a normative meaning of an (inclusive) cosmopolitan ethics which could in a modern globalized world replace the anachronistic (and exclusive) ethics of communitarianism.

Cosmopolitanism does understand the place of birth and the consequential communal bond or affiliation of an individual as completely coincidental and contingent. Affiliation with a certain social group, belonging to a said group is completely arbitrary and therefore any moral commitment set by justice should not be subject to the social background and loyalty an individual might feel.

In the core of cosmopolitan concept of citizenship is the idea that citizenship can also be based on rules and principles that are rooted and are founded on diversity and variety and not only on exclusivity of membership inside a territorial / national community. David Held (2010) talked of the idea of a global political organization “in which people can enjoy an equality of status with respect to the fundamental processes and institutions which govern their life expectancy and life chances” (Held 2010: 307). Only nations with a sense of identity that is open to diversity and solidarity and made according to the principle of general rules and guidelines can successfully adapt to the challenges and risks of the global era. Diversity and variety that we experience today can only thrive in a *global legal community*, which is advocated by Hauke Brunkhorst (2005).

The possibilities of such a society are being opposed by a number of authors, first and foremost by supporters of communitarianism in the form of national sovereignty and identity. Will Kymlicka (2010) claims that cosmopolitanism is taking the effects of globalization too seriously and that the democratic (national) citizenship has far from lost its role, nor is it an out-dated design. From this viewing point he attacks the cosmopolitan (global) citizenship and defends a point that national politics still has a great influential power and range and that is why we should not write it off or dismiss the democratic value of the national state and national citizenship, because “national units are primary – namely, they are the most important forum for assessing the legitimacy of other levels of government” (Kymlicka 2010: 441).

Kymlicka is also skeptical towards transnational institutions and organizations, namely because he sees no potential global political value as far as regulation is concerned for functioning politically. The reason for that is supposed to be namely in the lack of connection between people on a global scale. Such an inner connection can be (and is) provided by a nation state, by which it also provides a certain level of social solidarity. The idea of cosmopolitan democratic citizenship according to Kymlicka is

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<sup>1</sup> Probably the most important contribution by Ferdinand Tönnies (1955: 37) to sociology is his division of social groups to *Gemeinschaft* (community) and *Gesellschaft* (society). The first term means individuals connecting in “real and organic life”, while the other means connecting in “imaginary and mechanic structures”.

institutionally unfeasible, as well as sociologically impossible, since for the formulation of a common good various problems need to be eliminated, including language barriers, cultural differences, pluralistic conceptions of what is good, and figuring out the institutional feasibility of a cosmopolitan reform. Despite all this he does agree with some of the more important aspects of the cosmopolitan theory when he says that “many of our most important moral principles should be cosmopolitan in scope – e.g., principles of human rights, democracy, and environmental protection – and we should seek to promote these ideals internationally. But our democratic citizenship is, and will remain for the foreseeable future, national in scope” (Kymlicka 2010: 443).

This is quite the opposite of what Beck (1994: 16) says in his rejection of communitarian “litany of lost community” while emphasizing the idea of a new dialectics between the global and the local, which goes beyond the limits of national politics. So-called *glocal* questions surround us wherever we turn; we face them on a local, regional, as well as on a national and international level, but according to Beck they can only be resolved in a transnational environment, which calls for a reform of political structures, which will represent new political subjects: *cosmopolitan parties*. “These represent transnational interests transnationally, but also work within the arenas of national politics. They thus become possible, both programmatically and organizationally, only as national-global movements *and* cosmopolitan parties” (Beck 2010: 226). With its expulsion of individualism, its hatred – or at least contempt – towards anything or anyone foreign and with the nostalgia for a traditional society, communitarianism is left trapped in the social systems of the past, which have been keeping certain systems of social solidarities, but according to Beck the second modern stage of humanity requires a formation of new ones.

Second modernity, risk society, or liquid modern world, brought a transformation of the concept of welfare state. As Zygmunt Bauman (1998: 50) wrote, there is a noticeable difference between the *new poor* and the poor from the time of generosity and welfare state. If in the past that meant a vision of a good life, it has now been replaced by contempt against helping the needy (Gordon 1994: 1) and by those who receive without giving anything in return. “Rationality of interest is thereby set against the ethics of solidarity <...> The overall effect of means testing division instead of integration; exclusion instead of inclusion” (Bauman 1998: 50). The calculations of individuals who wish to find out whether they are winners or losers in a certain system are being reflected in the weakening of the welfare state. It is using its purpose and power, since individualization caused a fatal blow to utilitarianism and, more importantly, took away the power of unification away from the welfare state, which can no longer keep individuals in forced relationships of solidarity.

The common point of all communitarian theories is the protection and encouragement of the feeling of affiliation to a group where all members feel a mutual belonging. “Community is regarded as vital to people’s quality of life because of the impersonality of formal government structures and their association with coercion” (Crow 2002: 43). Amitai Etzioni (1997: 140) finds that the more a society depends on the government, the more the moral order and autonomy get weakened, and the

less the society is communitarian. Etzioni sees a solution to the social problems of the postmodern globalized time in return to a society structured in a communitarian manner, but he removes himself from traditional views of communitarianism (nation state) and instead suggests a formation of relationships on multiple levels. A community should connect individuals that have the same values and norms, as well as share a common history and identity (Etzioni 1997: 127). These societies of a smaller format (families, neighborhoods), would then connect at a higher level into bigger societies (towns, cities), which would then connect into even larger societies on a national and international level (Etzioni 1994: 32). These societies built on communitarian ideas would ensure much stronger bonds of solidarity among individuals within a community than societies (or communities) that are based on market interests or are regulated by the state.

Etzioni is obviously stemming from Durkheim, but is also including a very cosmopolitan demand that local or micro-communities be included into bigger communities on a larger scale. The fear of conservative communitarians that something like that would cause individuals to lose their identity or lose their cultural id is completely redundant. There is a tight connection between culture and identity where the latter plays a role of an unconditioned element of preferences of our culture. It is wrong to predict that belonging to a culture or society that an individual was born into prevents this individual to internalize *the Kantian position*, where the acknowledgement that we share the world with *others* is necessary. Jeremy Waldron (2010: 165–166) defends this exact position that Etzioni speaks of – a possibility of a double identity or perhaps a *multiple identity*, where we can speak of a compatibility of communitarianism with cosmopolitanism. One of the arguments for this is that many world cultures have some aspects of cosmopolitanism imprinted in their code. At the same time it is indisputable that it is characteristic for human cultures that ideas, habits and principles are spreading and are noticed and often incorporated into other cultures. *Pure culture* is a nonsense term, it is anomaly or at least extremely rare. Intact and uncontaminated cultures can only be explained by historic coincidences and extreme geographic isolation.

### The meaning of emotionality, education and culture

A key process is therefore identification, which on one side combines and connects people into communities and social groups, but on other side limits the reach of justice by doing so. The following question poses itself: is it possible to motivate people on a global level to gain a sense of moral responsibility for all human beings, and not just for the members of their own community? Answering “no” means giving up into the fate of the current situation; answering “yes” initiates a new question: how to form a cosmopolitan identity?

Patriotism and its sense of pride are morally and ethically extremely dangerous. To be a conscious citizen, to be loyal to one’s own country, to appreciate one’s country – is there any room left for all that this homeland is not or that which does not comply with its domain? To respect and love one’s country and its citizens – but what

about the rest? The concept of a country is artificial; artificially created and merely a construct and an abstraction. Nation state is an *imagined community* (Anderson 1991). The borders only exist on papers, on maps, and in our minds. The paradigm *us-them* (or *friend-enemy*) is obsolete, unethical, immoral and unworthy of value that it holds in the postmodern globalized world.

What is the boundary between patriotism and nationalism? It is widely accepted that citizens of a country respect it, are proud of it, but mostly feel a sense of belonging commitment to it. Why is that common? Why are students and younger school-children taught that they are primarily citizens of their own country and not people who were just born in an area of the Earth's surface? Why through educational programs on history and current situations in which the country finds itself the area in which they live is emphasized, instead of giving equal attention to the rest of the world they live in, and the area that surrounds them and their country is a part of?

Martha Nussbaum, a well-known and influential American philosopher, who mostly espouses the Kantian standpoint, emphasized the meaning of *cosmopolitan education*, which would demand of the education system to teach students that they are citizens of the world and that they share the world with everybody in it. Education programs therefore should embrace the Stoic cosmopolitan stance, which there are four arguments for, according to Nussbaum (2010: 159–161): 1) through cosmopolitan education, we learn more about ourselves; 2) we make headway solving problems that require international cooperation; 3) we recognize moral obligations to the rest of the world that are real and that otherwise would go unrecognized; 4) we make a consistent and coherent argument based on distinctions we are prepared to defend.

Air does not care about state borders. We live in a world where the fate of countries is very connected to basic goods and resources. Every ductile reflection on ecology, food supplies or population requires global planning, global knowledge and an acknowledgement of a communal future. A cosmopolitan education would assure an adequate basis for such reflections. Nussbaum builds her argument on an idea that our reflections should not be formed merely within our domestic sphere, but that it should also include the rights of other people (all people) to life, happiness and liberty. We should extend our knowledge that would enable us to provide these rights in a better way and it is very possible that such a way of thinking could have extreme consequences in both the economic and political fields.

In the everyday discourse it is widely accepted that every culture – and with that the identity of its members – is significant and so are its characteristics (language, traditions, habits, etc.). As a rule, a respect for other cultures means an appreciation for their diversities, colorfulness, but mostly focusing on those *features* of a culture in which it is different from ours. But, as Waldron (2010: 166–167) writes, the essence of a culture is not necessarily subjected to how different it is. It is not necessary for the culture to be completely different from other cultures, not even according to the impressions of the observers, not for the sake of the members of the culture, for it to be considered a specific culture. It is about members, who affiliate themselves with a culture, who participate in the way of life which is a part of the culture; following the norms and the patterns, which are kept and sustained by the individual members

and not by announcing them to the members and making them follow. Relationships between separate cultures include (irrational, emotional) conflict on lifestyles, which is the only *right* one through which the members identify themselves. Each culture has its own understanding of a good life; each interprets the world around it in a different manner and defines its relationship with the world accordingly. If not a pinch of cosmopolitanism can be found in a culture or a community, it can be very difficult for that community to recognize any value in the people outside its boundaries.

The main thing we can arrive to from Nussbaum and Waldron's standpoints is a universal and global recognition of other cultures, and most importantly an understanding that every culture has its traditions, which may not comply with our own. It is therefore human to leave every culture to live by its norms.

But – what happens when a culture believes in norms that demand a universal completion? All three Abrahamic religions are at the same time carriers of a culture and strive to universality. The imperialistic aims of some global hegemonies could be subjected to this question as well. Samuel P. Huntington (1993) wrote about his visions on the clash of civilizations in an interesting way, which could be understood as a cultural struggle. Huntington is one of the defenders of ethnicity and in some ways even cultural purity – he wonders (Huntington 2004), how to protect the American culture from a violent usurpation of the immigrants from South America, and he also speaks of radical Islam, where he strongly opposes the idea of cosmopolitan ethics.

Huntington believes that the world, while the era of great ideologies has ended, has returned to a point where the atmosphere on the transnational floor is still soaked with conflict, which are now based with cultural conflicts on a global level.

His thesis states that in the future the conflicts will be triggered mostly by cultural differences and by that also various religions. He takes his idea a step further when he claims that on the basis of the concept of the division of the world by civilizations as the highest form of cultural identity, it will be possible to analyze the possibilities for potential conflicts. “It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future” (Huntington 1993: 22).

Huntington's thesis is therefore quite the opposite from the cosmopolitan idea, stating that global conflicts arise mostly in areas that could be described as diverse in terms of culture, civilization and identity. He lists examples such as wars at the collapse of Yugoslavia, conflicts in Chechnya, between India and Pakistan, Palestine and Israel, etc. Not only does the world not have a chance to get closer to the cosmopolitan organization and global justice, but is actually distancing away from any possibility of becoming cosmopolitan in practice and is racing towards a *clash of civilizations*.

## Middle ground

Francis Fukuyama (1992), opposing Huntington's thesis, proclaims an ending to history, which means an end to revolutions, an end to alternatives and only one ideology remaining – an ideology of a liberal parliamentary democracy and a free capitalist market. The following dilemma occurs: is this ideology possible only in a system of nation states or can it be sustained transnationally, in a cosmopolitan sphere of political economy? Parliamentary democracy can for now only function in a small portion of nation states, let alone in international political structures; while the global market surpasses national borders and opens doors for market capitalism. To what extent is liberal nationalism compatible with cosmopolitan tendencies?

Many who oppose cosmopolitanism claim that national identity hinders and prevents cosmopolitan identity from taking place, while also claiming that (moral) duties inside national borders hold more value than those outside state lines. That is also true for the opinions of many liberal nationalists, for example David Miller (2000), who believes that for a true justice to exist, a strong feeling of national and affiliation identity must also be present. Thomas Nagel (2005) is among those who also think of a state as a necessary entity, which establishes an environment (conditions and limits) for justice, which is both egalitarian and distributional and which has an inherent normative value, which would be threatened by cosmopolitanism in its sense of transnationalism or global justice.

On the opposite side of the argument Simon Caney (2005) writes of these criticisms of cosmopolitanism as unfounded and unconvincing, and that a more compatible relationship could be generated, which would combine a normative sense of state with encouraging the participation of states by establishing conditions for a cosmopolitan global justice. We need to pay attention namely to two arguments, which are both for the nation state and which attempt to display the normative value of state as an environment, where distributive principles of justice takes place. These are 1) *the political cooperation argument* and 2) *the coercion argument* (Caney 2010: 193). Actually both arguments defend the principle that it is possible to apply equality in a domestic (national) environment but not in a global one, because equality can only be applied in a system of *political cooperation* which exists in a national environment, but not in a global one; and that equality can be applied in a domestic (national) environment, but not in a global one, because equality can only be applied among people ruled by a *common system of force*, and that the nation state is the forceful factor and not a global system.

The arguments can be contested in at least three parts. The first is *moral arbitrariness*, which means that belonging to a state and being a citizen, is completely coincidental. “Which state someone belongs to is, in very many cases, a matter of luck” (Caney 2010: 203). A happy coincidence can mean we were born in a good neighborhood with a decent standard and we must be really unlucky to be born in the droughty areas of sub-Saharan Africa but it is *perverse* to claim that such arbitrary fact could influence what belongs to us and what we are eligible for.

The second part implies *incompleteness and conservatism* of the views expressed by the arguments. Here it is especially important to stress the predispositions that the supporters of the nation state understand as obvious; the system of nation states is not being *thematized*, let alone problematized, and stemming from this basic assumption it is being assumed that distributive principles are true only for those inside state borders. But – why should it be so obvious that the world is divided politically into states? Why the need for nation states? “Why not, for example, have a system of multilevel governance in which power is shared between global authorities, state-level authorities and sub-state institutions?” (Caney 2005: 148 ff).

The third part of the criticism is *theoretical inadequacy*; more precisely the inherently global problems that the theory of citizenship cannot (and is incapable of) addressing. Caney (2010: 205) speaks of environmental changes, among other things, which influence and concern the whole planet and cannot be avoided regardless of the country we live in. Therefore we cannot escape the fact that global environmental changes raise questions of distributive justice and that these are questions raised on a global and even trans-generational level.

Finding middle ground between the nationalistic (statist) standpoint and the standpoint of cosmopolitan egalitarian global justice is possible. Caney (2010: 207–210) delivers four suggestions: 1) *The instrumental importance of political institutions*, which instructs the cosmopolitans not to decline the value and role of political institutions but instead to encourage a reform of some of the existing one, which can only be done by the nation states – alone or in connection to others. The latter means a restructuring of some of the existing transnational organizations, the functioning of which would be much more effective had they been organized in the postmodern spirit of cosmopolitanism. 2) *Political institutions and the ascription of duties to uphold the cosmopolitan entitlements of co-citizens*. The second proposition, perhaps unclear at first glance, simply means that somebody being either Indian or Swedish should not influence what and how much of what they are entitled to, but should only affect the content of their duties. It means that the Swedes, just because they are Swedish, are not entitled to more goods or resources or moral value than the Indians, just because they are Indian. 3) *Political identity, patriotism, guilt and shame*. The majority of people have their identity at least partly formed on the basis of citizenships, of which country they belong to. Individuals feel their citizenships as an inner part of themselves, and that is why it often happens that a person experiences a strong feeling of either guilt or shame if a country whose citizen he is has done something unjust or against the person’s moral code. On the other side these same individuals may experience feelings of pride and patriotism when their country or fellow citizens are successful. Why could not these feelings be transferred to a global level? Is it true that state borders are only as far as our emotions can go? 4) *Political identity and the ascription duties of compensation*. In his final proposition Caney speaks of compensation between former colonial forces and former colonies. He finds that it is of utmost importance to get compensation for historic evil that colonizers have brought upon their colonies; but the cosmopolitan position in this case is that political identity can only influence *who* owns another compensation, but not *how much* they own.

In short, Caney's cosmopolitanism does not demand full compensation for the damages caused throughout history, but instead suggest a way to share the burden within the system of distributive justice. He does admit, however, this about the nation state: "it *may* have normative significance as an instrument of cosmopolitan justice, as a source of duties and as an object of loyalty, pride or shame" (Caney 2010: 210). But even more than that, its meaning lies in identification.

### Multilevel and multiple identities

Multilevel identity as predicted by cosmopolitanism (Etzioni 1994; Waldron 2010) is not only an utopian idea, but is a concept (or a process), that is very present in the lives of every individual even in an environment of extreme communitarian principles and a nation state of a modern type. Identity holds a key role where personality formation is concerned: through a philosophical reflection (identity of a person as a person and its history), social differentiation (identity of a person in relation to another person), and psychological self-awareness (identity of person's personality). "If no other reason, identification matters because it is the basic cognitive mechanism that humans use to sort out themselves and their fellows, individually and collectively. This is a 'baseline' sorting that is fundamental to the organization of the human world: it is how we know who's who and what's what. We could not do whatever we do, as humans, without also being able to do this" (Jenkins 2008: 13). In general identity is "a way in which individual or collective differentiate themselves in relation to other individuals or collectives. Identities are made out of similarities and differences – these are dynamic principles of identity and the heart of a social life" (Nastran Ule 2000: 3).

The construction of an identity goes through many phases of discourse, practice and position, which are most often of the antagonistic type (Hall 1996: 2–4). But despite the constant transformation and with all the complexity of the constant changes of identity they do carry the *charge* of tradition within themselves and with that charge they carry continuity and history, which serves as their *base*.

Context is always the condition to interaction, which enables said interaction or challenges it into being. Context needs to be understood in the sense of a social cell or group within which the individuals meet each other. The most obvious case of that is a *family*. Inside a family every member has a role, which is constant and unchanging; the individual A maintains the same relationship with the individual B for the entire time. If A is the biological daughter of B, who is male, then it is true that B is the biological father of A. This relationship, through which two individuals identify themselves, remains unchanged; A will never be B's sister or aunt, A will always be B's daughter, and B will always be the father. We could say that the family tree does not change, but only grows new branches, while the old ones remain in their place in the structure. Even on that level it is a pretty complex matrix of identification bonds, since A is not only the daughter of B, but also the daughter of C, perhaps even the sister of D, but definitely the granddaughter of two, actually four other individuals. If the individual A finds herself inside the context of a family (inside the structure of her family), she accepts her identity on the basis of the interaction with the other family

members. Binary oppositions take place, bipolar relationships with two positions in the structure presenting a difference happen.

We speak of the well-known *local criteria or criteria of position* as described by Gilles Deleuze (2004: 173–175) in his article “How do we recognize structuralism?”. The elements of a structure are not externally labelled, nor do they bear any kind of internal meaning. “The elements of a structure have neither extrinsic designation, nor intrinsic signification. Then what is left?”. The elements of a structure do not have anything else than a sense; “a sense which is necessarily and uniquely ‘positional’”. They are the positions and spots in the structural space. The positional criterion is not exposing places or sites in the real dimension, not even spots or position in the imaginary dimension. Deleuze’s second criterion is referring to the symbolic, which can be located only “in a properly structural space, that is, a topological space”. Structural is the space alone. It is un-extended and pre-dimensional space – pure *spatium*. Places or sites in the pure structural space are primary according to the things and material entities that they occupy; primary also about the relations with the imaginary roles and events, which essentially appear, when these places are taken. Deleuze applies to Claude Lévi-Strauss, when he states that sense arises from the combination of elements, which on their own bare no sense. Sense arises from the element’s position or *locus* in the structure.

A person or an individual does not belong to a family alone. A person does not form their own identity merely on the basis of what his bonds with his relatives are, that is, who he is connected with according to the family tree, but his bonds go everywhere, in every situation, he is connected to a certain context (or more contexts), within which he identifies himself on the basis of difference / contrast to others. “For an individual and communal confidence difference is key. For each and every formation of identity there has to be an existence of difference between me and my surroundings, between my family and another family, between my neighborhood and the one across town <...> In any case difference is mother of identity <...> Difference set by limits and borders, *fnis*, of an individual, will always set and define that individual <...> A basic criteria of belonging can only be realized by invention, maintenance and shifting of difference. It is those that keep on establishing and moving the borders between us and them” (Debeljak 2004a: 60–61).

With the theory of concentric circles of identities we can display that cosmopolitanism is being formed and maintained in these exact ways. It is an approach to the explanation of the plurality of identities which defends the thesis that people do not live with one tradition alone, but are a part of multiple *circles*, which “derive from various local and fertile environments, from neighborhoods to regions, opening outwards into increasingly abstract forms of national, citizens’ and European identities, closing – for those with the sharpest capabilities of reflection – perhaps in a common humanity” (Debeljak 2004b: 92).

A circle may also be described as context. Identity is always formed based on the difference / contrast in binary oppositions within different contexts. The individual without being in interaction with another individual is not a defined member of a family, which means he is not yet defining himself with a position within the family circle, but is merely a member of the family without a clearly defined role, that is without

an identity of his own. It is the same in all levels higher, in all wider concentric circles of identities.

This approach to the explanation of a person's identity displays the process of identifying a person based on the differentiating the person and another member of the family, after which the family (as a group) identifies itself in the context of its home town, which already has a place in the structure of its surroundings, which is usually a part of a country or state. Each state obviously and clearly defines its neighbors by setting borders, and these are always placed in a global neighborhood or within a global region (a continent, for example), as well as within a context of a civilization (in the sense of Huntington). Here it is possible to dispute the argument by saying that it is not true of any country that all its members would belong to the same civilization. And while that is true, it is important to acknowledge that on the level of the state or country, it is no longer about individual persons, but about states as independent political entities. These always have a government or a leader who is (legal or not), a representative of the country<sup>2</sup>. On the highest level of the social complex are civilizations: the highest cultural-political entities within the human communities and therefore within humanity itself.

If the identification of a person is theoretically implemented by contrasting others it is also obvious that a person identifies itself inside various interest groups. That is why a breakdown of the process of identification to *socio-political* identification (subject / individual – family – hometown – region – state – civilization – humanity) and *socio-interest* identification (the subject / individual is integrated into various activities of interest in the areas of education, work, entertainment, activism, politics, etc.) is appropriate. The first type of identification is coincidental, assigned, mostly even innate. On the other side the second type of identification has far more potential of dynamics. The important difference lies in the *formation* of structure of both: 1) socio-political identification is vertical (mostly even hierarchically organized), which means that the identification begins at the level of an individual and continues on higher levels (or wider circles) in collective contexts, which become wider as the levels get higher; 2) socio-interest identification is hierarchically unidentified and spread over vastly, while the identification contacts do not spill over quite as often.

## Conclusions

Supporters of communitarianism and the concept of a modern nation state claim that it is still of high significance. Some believe that without this concept, the enlightenment project of social cohesiveness and solidarity would fall apart (Kymlicka 2010; Nagel 2005). Cosmopolitans on the other side believe that the bicentennial age of revolutions

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<sup>2</sup> Civil wars and territorial conflicts are in their essence conflicts of identities and wars for identity. Up until the Islamic revolution in 1978 and the fall of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi the following year Iran presented itself as a pro-West country (despite the inner ambivalence), but after the revolution and with the beginning of theocratic power Iran changed its appearance to the world and turned away from the West, with which it changed its identity as a country. There are many similar cases, even recent.

(1789 the French Revolution – 1989 the fall of the Berlin Wall) is over. The end of this age brings the end of the Age of Enlightenment, modernist ideas and perhaps even the end of history. The grand narratives are passé (Lyotard 1984) and the time of the post-modern era has begun, bringing with it a new conceptualization of a nation and state, community, interpersonal relations, solidarity and political economy in general.

The paper presented the main standpoints of cosmopolitan and communitarian theories. The cosmopolitan theory stresses the moral concerns of every individual, and believes that all human lives are equal and that cosmopolitan principles should apply to everybody. Communitarianism on the other hand focuses on emotional connections that bond all the individuals in one community to which they are arbitrarily connected. Such an individual can identify himself with the (local or national) community easier than a cosmopolitan individual. The latter is connected to other individuals only by being human.

The paper stressed the meaning of education and culture – they maintain the *old* way of community perception and the potential to change this paradigm. The supporters of communitarianism and nation state fear that an individual would lose himself in a cosmopolitan environment. He supposedly loses his national identity which is, according to communitarianism, an essential part of identity. This fear is unnecessary because the paper showed the compatibility of cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism. I also presented the structure of an individual's identity as a multiple-identity: Man is a part of different contexts and builds his identity according to the situation he is in. It can be established that the multilevel identity already exists and is compatible with the legacy of communitarianism. Individuals are constantly interacting with others and form their identities in families, groups with the same interests, countries etc. Why insist on the importance of a national identity when all the people succumb to the process of multiple identifications? It is essential that political structures follow this process.

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## NACIONALINĖ VALSTYBĖ IR KOSMOPOLITINIS IDENTITETAS POSTMODERNIAJAME GLOBALIZACIJOS PASAULYJE

Tadej Pirc

Santrauka

Straipsnyje gvildenama dilema, postmoderniosios epochos iškelta globalizuotam pasauliui, kuriame nacionalinė valstybė, viena vertus, praranda savo tvirtumą ir suverenumą, tačiau, kita vertus, yra stiprinama netikėto globalizacijos poveikio. Tai poveikis kovos už savo paties identitetą, su kuriuo stiprėja ir nacionalinis piliečių identitetas. Tačiau kitas aspektas, kurį taip pat reprezentuoja kosmopolitinis požiūris, siekia atverti komunitarinio tipo uždaras visuomenes kitiems horizontams, kuriems piliečiai neprivalėtų aukoti savo pačių identitetų, o tik turėtų pripažinti, kad identiteto daugialypiškumas yra neišvengiamas. Straipsnyje palaikoma tezė, kad kosmopolitinio identiteto formavimas, kuris gali būti palaikomas postmoderniosios epochos globalizuotos kultūrinės aplinkos, nėra vien tik galimybė, bet ir realybė, kurią turi pripažinti politinės struktūros.

Reikšminiai žodžiai: komunitarizmas, kosmopolitizmas, kultūra, globalizacija, identitetas, nacionalinė valstybė, postmodernioji epocha.

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